Die nachhaltige Produktivitätskrise der Industrieländer – United we stand, divided we fall

Georg Erber, Ulrich Fritsche und Patrick Harms, 31. Okt. 2016 Ökonomenstimme

Seit den siebziger Jahre befinden sich die Industrieländer nun bereits in einer eigentlichen Produktivitätskrise. Um diesen Trend zu brechen, bräuchte es eine koordinierte Wachstumsstrategie aller Länder, wie dieser Beitrag zeigt.

Spätestens seit dem Ausbruch der globalen Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise im Jahr 2008 hat das globale Wirtschaftswachstum erneut deutlich an Geschwindigkeit verloren. Nicht nur die USA als Ausgangspunkt der Finanzkrise, sondern auch Europa im Zuge der Eurokrise, die insbesondere die sogenannten PIIGS-Staaten^[ 1 ] in eine tiefe Rezession stürzten, konnten nur für einige Jahre mit massiven weltweiten Konjunkturprogrammen nach dem Pittsburgh-Gipfel stabilisiert und teilweise zu einem Wirtschaftsaufschwung zurückgeführt werden.

Die USA und die VR China nahmen dabei als die zwei größten Volkswirtschaften eine Schlüsselrolle ein. Allerdings zeigte sich sehr rasch, dass mit dem sukzessiven Auslaufen der Programme, der selbsttragende Aufschwung in der Mehrzahl der Länder insbesondere in Europa sowie auch in Japan, welches schon seit Beginn der Balance-Sheet-Rezession zu Beginn der 1990er^[ 2 ] Jahre an einer langanhaltenden Wachstumsschwäche leidet, nicht zurückgekehrt sind. Das durch schubweise diskretionäre Fiskalpolitik induzierte Wirtschaftswachstum scheint jedoch immer mehr an seine Grenzen zu stoßen.^[ 3 ]

An Inheritance of Incompetence

By John Mauldin, August 13, 2016 

Summer in Bretton Woods
IMF Love Affairs
PIIGS in Bankruptcy
“We Need an Event”
European Bias
An Inheritance of Incompetence

“Always remember that the future comes one day at a time.”

– Dean Acheson

“Practical men who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.”

– John Maynard Keynes

I don’t often agree with Keynes, but he is the most quotable of all major economists. The above sentence was one of his best. He was right about defunct economists. Of course, he was talking about all those other defunct economists who no longer kept up with his new and improved way of thinking about all things economic. Now his quip comes back to haunt his legacy and his followers.

Theories and practices often outlive their usefulness in our fast-changing world. So do institutions, including those chartered at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference. In today’s letter we are going to look closely at the International Monetary Fund and a scathing report from its own internal auditors. For those of us who have been following the IMF for decades, the report is not all that surprising.

My real purpose here is not to point the finger at the IMF but to point out where its problems are part and parcel of a greater problem in global institutions. During the next global recession we are going to see a continuation of the same approaches to crisis solving that we’ve seen in the past, based on the theories of defunct economists mixed with personal and institutional biases. Their prescription is a witches’ brew that we will be told is good for us but that will in fact ensure that those of us least able to cope will bear the brunt of its impact.

Wirtschaftskrise im Süden: So wird das nichts mit Europa

Date: 31-07-2016
Source: SPIEGEL

Südstaaten: Europas Defizitproblem

In Italien droht ein Bankenkollaps, in Spanien, Portugal und Frankreich herrscht der Schuldenstaat: Die Eurozone driftet auseinander, Regeln werden kaum noch eingehalten.

Zusammengefasst: Südeuropa hat die Krise noch nicht überwunden: Spanien und Portugal überziehen ihre Haushalte massiv, auch Frankreich wird noch auf Jahre hinaus die EU-Defizitgrenze reißen, und in Italien droht eine Bankenkrise. Zugleich sind weder die EU-Kommission noch die nordeuropäischen Staaten derzeit bereit, die Euro-Stabilitätsregeln durchzusetzen. Kritiker sehen darin eine Gefahr für die Gemeinschaftswährung.

Eigentlich war alles wie immer: Die Südeuropäer hatten ihre Haushalte überzogen, und Wolfgang Schäuble gab den Vorkämpfer für eiserne Disziplin. Man habe bewiesen, „dass die Regeln des Stabilitätspakts tatsächlich angewandt werden“, sagte der Bundesfinanzminister, nachdem er und seine EU-Amtskollegen Mitte Juli ein Strafverfahren gegen Spanien und Portugal eingeleitet hatten.

Währungsfonds gesteht große Fehler in der Eurokrise ein

András Szigetvari, 29. Juli 2016, 18:21 derstandard.at

Ein interner Bericht übt heftige Kritik an der Antikrisenstrategie des IWF in der Eurozone. Der Fonds soll Probleme ignoriert haben

Wien – Am Sonntag, dem 16. März 2008 geht die 85-jährige Geschichte von Bear Stearns zu Ende. Die fünftgrößte Investmentbank der Wall Street hat hoch spekuliert. In den ersten Märztagen verliert das Institut täglich mehrere Milliarden Dollar wegen schiefgelaufener Finanzdeals. Die US-Notenbank muss mit einem Kredit helfen, Bear Stearns wird spottbillig an einen Konkurrenten verkauft. Nach dem Ende der Bank beginnen sich Investoren zu fragen, welches Institut als nächstes wanken könnte. Ins Gerede kommt Irland: Das Euroland ist Heimat vieler aufgeblähter Kreditinstitute wie der Anglo Irish. Was, wenn Anglo in Probleme schlittert – wird Irland das Institut retten, kann sich Dublin das leisten?

Hektische Betriebsamkeit

Debt crises in Europe and US states: Sovereign spillovers on private borrowers

Cristina Arellano, Andy Atkeson, Mark L. J. Wright 10 January 2016,  voxeu

Cristina Arellano

Senior economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis; adjunct professor, University of Minnesota

Andy Atkeson

Stanley M Zimmerman Professor of Finance and Economics and Director of the Business Economics Program, UCLA

Mark L. J. Wright

Senior economist and research advisor, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

In the recent crisis in Southern Europe both sovereign governments and private citizens faced increased borrowing costs on their external debt. By contrast, no spillover to private borrowers occurred from the recent US state government debt crisis. This column argues that this different experience stems from much weaker European protections from government interference – the risk that governments will encumber private debt contracts by redenominating the currency of the contract, imposing capital controls, or passing debtor relief legislation.

During the recent crisis in Southern Europe both sovereign governments and private citizens faced increased borrowing costs on their external debt. While the simultaneity of public and private external debt crises was a common occurrence in emerging markets during the last century, as Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) document, it has been a rare occurrence among the advanced economies. For example, the recent debt crises among the US states, such as California, Illinois, and the territory of Puerto Rico, have had a limited effect on the borrowing costs of their private citizens.

Alternative measures of government indebtedness

Daniel A. Dias, Mark L. J. Wright 13 November 2015, voxeu

Daniel A. Dias

Economist in the International Finance Division, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Mark L. J. Wright

Senior economist and research advisor, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Measured as a percentage of its GDP, Greece’s debt is higher than that of Portugal and Ireland. This column discusses a range of new techniques for measuring the debts of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. It argues that plausible alternative measures of indebtedness suggest that Greece is anywhere from as much as 50% more indebted than Portugal and Ireland to as little as half as indebted. The most reasonable measures imply that Greece is far less indebted than is commonly reported.

According to Eurostat, the Greek government owed €317 billion in debt at the end of 2014. This is equivalent to more than 177% of its GDP, 387% of its tax revenue, and amounts to almost €30,000 per person. This seems like a very large sum. For comparison with other highly indebted European countries that received financial assistance, the Portuguese government’s debt amounted to 130% of GDP, while the Irish debt amounted to 110% of GDP.

Eurozone crisis: Looking back to the future

Graciela Laura Kaminsky 08 November 2015, voxeu

Graciela Laura Kaminsky

Professor of Economics and International Affairs, George Washington University

The Eurozone crisis is still lingering. This column uses data from 100 years of sovereign defaults to portray a new take on the crisis. The findings indicate that crises in a financial centre have persistent adverse effects on the periphery. They lead to more economic losses than home-grown idiosyncratic crises. Successful restructuring of such crises would require substantially larger debt write downs than those following idiosyncratic crises.

The Eurozone crisis is still lingering. While in the last couple of months only Greece’s debt woes have been at the centre of public attention, vulnerabilities across countries in the Eurozone are not fading away. Europe is still mired in a long depression, and debt problems are still escalating. While it is true that Ireland, Portugal, and Spain managed to exit their bailouts and Cyprus has recently announced that it intends to do the same, their debt problems are still lingering with debt/GDP ratios at around 100% or more. But the list does not end with the bailout countries. We could add Belgium, France, and Italy to this list of debt-ridden countries. What is the scope of this crisis?

GRIECHENLAND: KEIN ANFANG VOM ENDE

FURCHE-Kolumne 177, 5. November, 2015, Wilfried Stadler

Nach mehrmonatiger Aufmerksamkeit für seine schwierige Position in der Flüchtlingsfrage wird Griechenland nun wieder zum Wirtschaftsthema. Denn zu wohl Niemandes Überraschung spießt es sich neuerlich bei den Staatsschulden.
Nach der Einigung über ein drittes Hilfspaket zu Beginn des Sommers festigte Ministerpräsident Tsipras in Neuwahlen geschickt seine innenpolitische Position. Sein Kurzzeit-Finanzminister Yannis Varoufakis profilierte sich indessen als Vorreiter eines urban-bourgeoisen Neomarxismus, hochbezahlter Kongressredner und Duellpartner prominenter Ökonomen. Sein Bestseller „Time for Change“ (Untertitel: „Wie ich meiner Tochter die Wirtschaft erkläre“) wurde im Feuilleton der ZEIT gar dafür gelobt, dass hier „ein Romantiker der Seele gegen die Zahlenkolonnen der Pragmatiker antritt“. Zuletzt war er sich mit Grexit-Befürworter Hans-Werner Sinn darüber einig, dass Griechenland dem Euro besser gar nicht beigetreten wäre – worin Beiden zuzustimmen ist.

Low interest rates, capital flows, and declining productivity in South Europe

Gita Gopinath, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Loukas Karabarbounis, Carolina Villegas-Sanchez 28 September 2015, voxeu

Gita Gopinath

Professor of Economics, Harvard University

Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan

Neil Moskowitz Endowed Professor of Economics, University of Maryland; Research Fellow, CEPR

Loukas Karabarbounis

Associate Professor of Economics at the Booth School of Business, University of Chicago

 Carolina Villegas-Sanchez

Assistant Professor at the Economics Department , ESADE Business School

Joining the Eurozone was once a near unquestionably good idea. Now, the costs of joining the monetary union are under close scrutiny. This column takes a slightly different tack, presenting an alternative perspective on how joining the euro has impacted productivity in southern Europe. It turns out that capital wasn’t allocated efficiently across firms after cheap borrowing at low interest rates, impacting total factor productivity.

The ongoing Greek debt crisis has renewed interest among economists and policymakers in understanding the costs associated with joining the Eurozone. It has also generated concerns that countries in Southern Europe could have been better off if they had never joined in the first place. Partly, these concerns arise from the fact that countries in the south were able to borrow at lower interest rates in the run up to and following the introduction of the euro. As creditors deemed these countries less risky than before and as the ECB strengthened its anti-inflationary policy, borrowing rates decreased and these economies experienced large inflows of capital (Feldstein 2012).

Reuters’ Public Relations Missif

September 1, 2015

By Michael Hudson

As published on Counterpunch:

This autumn may see anti-austerity coalitions gain power in Portugal, Spain and Italy, while Marine le Pen’s National Front in France presses for outright withdrawal from the eurozone. These countries face a common problem: how to resist the economic devastation that the European Central Bank (ECB), European Council and IMF “troika” has inflicted on Greece and is now intending to do the same to southern Europe.

To resist the depression and debt deflation that the troika seeks to deepen, one needs to bear in mind the dynamics that make the IMF un-reformable. Its destructive role in Greece provides an object lesson for how southern Europe must shun its horde of ideologues, as Third World countries learned to avoid it by May 2013, the year that Turkey capped the world’s extrication from IMF “advice.” Already in 2008, Turkey’s prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced: “We cannot darken our future by bowing to the wishes of the IMF.”[1] Greek voters have now said the same thing.