Reinhart and Rogoff to Krugman: ‘Spectacularly Uncivil Behavior’

Yes, Krugman is uncivil, not ony this time. Probably because he lost his beloved cat (hfk)

Date: 27-05-2013
Source: The Wall Street Journal

Kenneth Rogoff

The gloves are off in the roiling academic dispute over the merits of austerity and the dangers of debt.

In the latest round, Harvard economists Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart accused Princeton economist and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman of “spectacularly uncivil behavior” and the inaccurate allegation that they refused to share data supporting their work linking heavy debt levels to subsequent slow economic growth.

Papers such as Mr. Rogoff and Ms. Reinhart’s, which warn of the perils of too much government debt, “haven’t just lost their canonized status, they’ve become the objects of much ridicule,” Mr. Krugman wrote in a recent New York Review of Books attack on advocates of austerity.

“Despite their paper’s influence, Reinhart and Rogoff had not made their data widely available—and researchers working with seemingly comparable data hadn’t been able to reproduce their results,” Mr. Krugman wrote.

Mr. Rogoff and Ms. Reinhart responded Sunday in a five-page letter and a four-page appendix to Mr. Krugman, posted on their website:

“We admire your past scholarly work, which influences us to this day. So it has been with deep disappointment that we have experienced your spectacularly uncivil behavior the past few weeks,” the letter said. “You have attacked us in very personal terms, virtually nonstop, in your New York Times column and blog posts. Now you have doubled down in the New York Review of Books, adding the accusation we didn’t share our data.”

How the Case for Austerity Has Crumbled

June 6, 2013

Paul Krugman

The Alchemists: Three Central Bankers and a World on Fire

by Neil Irwin
Penguin, 430 pp., $29.95

Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea
by Mark Blyth
Oxford University Press, 288 pp., $24.95

The Great Deformation: The Corruption of Capitalism in America
by David A. Stockman
PublicAffairs, 742 pp., $35.00

In normal times, an arithmetic mistake in an economics paper would be a complete nonevent as far as the wider world was concerned. But in April 2013, the discovery of such a mistake—actually, a coding error in a spreadsheet, coupled with several other flaws in the analysis—not only became the talk of the economics profession, but made headlines. Looking back, we might even conclude that it changed the course of policy.

Why? Because the paper in question, “Growth in a Time of Debt,” by the Harvard economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, had acquired touchstone status in the debate over economic policy. Ever since the paper was first circulated, austerians—advocates of fiscal austerity, of immediate sharp cuts in government spending—had cited its alleged findings to defend their position and attack their critics. Again and again, suggestions that, as John Maynard Keynes once argued, “the boom, not the slump, is the right time for austerity”—that cuts should wait until economies were stronger—were met with declarations that Reinhart and Rogoff had shown that waiting would be disastrous, that economies fall off a cliff once government debt exceeds 90 percent of GDP.

The Tragedy of the European Union and How to Resolve It

George Soros SEPTEMBER 27, 2012, NYR 

In a fast-moving situation, significant changes have occurred since this article went to press. On August 1, as I write below, Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann objected to the assertion by Mario Draghi, the president of the European Central Bank, that the ECB will “do whatever it takes to preserve the euro as a stable currency.” Weidmann emphasized the statutory limitation on the powers of the ECB. Since this article was published, however, it has become clear that Chancellor Merkel has sided with Draghi, leaving Weidmann isolated on the board of the ECB.

This was a game-changing event. It committed Germany to the preservation of the euro. President Draghi has taken full advantage of this opportunity. He promised unlimited purchases of the government bonds of debtor countries up to three years in maturity provided they reached an agreement with the European Financial Stability Facility and put themselves under the supervision of the Troika—the executive committee of the European Union, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.

The euro crisis has entered a new phase. The continued survival of the euro is assured but the future shape of the European Union will be determined by the political decisions the member states will have to take during the next year or so. The alternatives are extensively analyzed in the article that follows.

—September 7, 2012

I have been a fervent supporter of the European Union as the embodiment of an open society—a voluntary association of equal states that surrendered part of their sovereignty for the common good. The euro crisis is now turning the European Union into something fundamentally different. The member countries are divided into two classes—creditors and debtors—with the creditors in charge, Germany foremost among them. Under current policies debtor countries pay substantial risk premiums for financing their government debt, and this is reflected in the cost of financing in general. This has pushed the debtor countries into depression and put them at a substantial competitive disadvantage that threatens to become permanent.

This is the result not of a deliberate plan but of a series of policy mistakes that started when the euro was introduced. It was general knowledge that the euro was an incomplete currency—it had a central bank but did not have a treasury. But member countries did not realize that by giving up the right to print their own money they exposed themselves to the risk of default. Financial markets realized it only at the onset of the Greek crisis. The financial authorities did not understand the problem, let alone see a solution. So they tried to buy time. But instead of improving, the situation deteriorated. This was entirely due to the lack of understanding and the lack of unity.

Does the Euro Have a Future?

October 13, 2011, George Soros

Michele Tantussi/Bloomberg via Getty ImagesGerman Chancellor Angela Merkel and Portuguese Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho, Berlin, September 1, 2011

The euro crisis is a direct consequence of the crash of 2008. When Lehman Brothers failed, the entire financial system started to collapse and had to be put on artificial life support. This took the form of substituting the sovereign credit of governments for the bank and other credit that had collapsed. At a memorable meeting of European finance ministers in November 2008, they guaranteed that no other financial institutions that are important to the workings of the financial system would be allowed to fail, and their example was followed by the United States.

China& Liberation of Tibet: Rules of the Game

‎Montag, ‎22. ‎August ‎2011, ‏‎16:45:00

Robert Barnett, NYR

Xinhua

Audience members at the ceremony for ‘the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of Tibet,’ Lhasa, July 19, 2011

Much of the talk about Vice President Joe Biden’s four-day visit to China last week centered on the man who hosted him: Xi Jinping, expected to become the country’s next president in 2012. Biden’s office has said that the principal purposes of his visit were “to build a relationship with Vice-President Xi” and “to get to know China’s future leadership.” But working out the thinking of China’s leaders has always been extremely difficult, and Xi is no exception.

The Slump Goes On

The Slump Goes On: Why?

September 30, 2010, Paul Krugman and Robin Wells

Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy
by Raghuram G. Rajan
Princeton University Press, 260 pp., $26.95

Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Finance
by Nouriel Roubini and Stephen Mihm
Penguin, 353 pp., $27.95

The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics: Lessons from Japan’s Great Recession
by Richard C. Koo
Wiley, 296 pp., $45.00

Nouriel Roubini; drawing by John Springs

In the winter of 2008–2009, the world economy was on the brink. Stock markets plunged, credit markets froze, and banks failed in a mass contagion that spread from the US to Europe and threatened to engulf the rest of the world. During the darkest days of crisis, the United States was losing 700,000 jobs a month, and world trade was shrinking faster than it did during the first year of the Great Depression.

Obama’s Risky Business

Heute, 16. Juli 2010, by Jeff Madrick . New York Review of Books

The financial reregulation package just passed by Congress is far from a comprehensive reform of American finance. Despite the enormous threat to the world’s financial markets created by the failure of Lehman Brothers and the stunning excesses of insurance giant AIG and banking conglomerate Citigroup, the reforms are in truth modest. Neither the Obama administration nor Congress opted to cut banks down to size, and the bill is only placing mild limits on risky banking activities. The giant financial institutions, meanwhile, are as big—even bigger—than ever and bankers’ compensation is once again at stunning levels.

The Euro: The Engine That Couldn’t

Josef Joffe, 4 Dec 97. Der berühmte Artikel des damaligen SZ chefredakteurs und heutigen Zeit-Herausgebers mit der Warnung vor der Euro Einführung, dass die monetäre Union nur eine politische sei. Aus der New York Review of Books. (hfk)

“European Monetary Union—The Movie” would have to begin with the following scene. The place is the library of the Elysée Palace, the time is about March 1990. Only three people are present: François Mitterrand, the French president; Helmut Kohl, the chancellor of soon-to-be reunited Germany; finally, since neither speaks the language of the other, a faceless interpreter sworn to silence.

Mitterrand is in a melancholy mood. During the last few months, ever since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, he has tried every conceivable diplomatic strategem to stop, or at least brake, the quickening pace of German reunification. But to no avail. Glumly, he stares into the fireplace, as his friend Helmut talks. “Look, François, this time it won’t be like Versailles in 1871, when Paris was encircled by German armies, when the new Reich was proclaimed on the ruins of French pride. We have Franco-German friendship, we have the European Union, our forces are completely integrated in NATO; indeed, we don’t even have our own general staff any more.”

At the Heart of the Crash

The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
by Michael Lewis
Norton, 266 pp., $27.95 

Natalie Behring/ReutersGoldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein at a speech by President Barack Obama on financial regulation, New York City, April 22, 2010  

Not the least striking revelation of Michael Lewis’s excellent book, The Big Short, is that this author of financial best-sellers has changed his mind. In a column for Bloomberg News in early 2007, he praised the rapidly expanding market for derivatives. Visiting the annual meeting of financiers and policymakers at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, that year, he was exasperated by the fears of some of the participants. “None of them seemed to understand that when you create a derivative you don’t add to the sum total of risk in the financial world,” he wrote, sounding arguments very similar to those made by Alan Greenspan. “You merely create a means for redistributing that risk. They have no evidence that financial risk is being redistributed in ways we should all worry about.” 

As we now know, derivatives were the instruments that enabled Wall Street to stretch capital dangerously far—and were at the center of the financial crisis that began that year. They are investment contracts between two parties based on other securities, which require little capital up-front, enabling buyers and sellers to take temporary large investment stakes inexpensively, including in mortgage securities. “What we have found over the years in the marketplace is that derivatives have been an extraordinarily useful vehicle to transfer risk from those who shouldn’t be taking it to those who are willing to and are capable of doing so,” Greenspan told Congress in 2003. Lewis wrote in 2007: “The most striking thing about the growing derivatives markets is the stability that has come with them.”

Our Giant Banking Crisis—What to Expect

May 13, 2010 

by Robin Wells, Paul Krugman

 

This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly
by Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff
Princeton University Press, 463 pp., $35.00  

World Economic Outlook, April 2009: Crisis and Recovery
by the International Monetary Fund
228 pp., available at [www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org)    

World Economic Outlook, October 2009: Sustaining the Recovery
by the International Monetary Fund
208 pp., available at [www.imf.org](
http://www.imf.org
)     

John Thys/AFP/Getty Images  German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy at an EU summit in Brussels, where Greece’s debt crisis dominated discussions about broader economic reform, February 11, 2010  

Lately, the big concern roiling financial markets has been fear of Greek default. The risks seem obvious: Greek government debt is at levels that have historically signaled deep trouble for middle-income nations, and debt is still rising rapidly thanks to a large deficit. Meanwhile, Greece is suffering a severe recession in large part because costs have gotten far out of line with the rest of Europe. And one more thing: Greece has a long history of default—in fact, the nation has been in arrears on its debt for half its modern history.