Why Wall Street Fears Derivatives Regulation

 

Regulation May 6, 2010,

Why Wall Street Fears Derivatives Regulation

A provision in the finance reform bill could force banks to exit a highly profitable business

By Dawn Kopecki

A two-page provision tucked inside the 1,500-plus-page financial reform bill being debated in the Senate has Wall Street worried. The provision would change the structure of about 40 of the largest U.S. banks by forcing them to spin off their derivatives businesses, which provide billions of dollars in profits annually

Und keiner prüft die Prüfer

Frank Drost, Peter Köhler, Michael Maisch, Donnerstag, 17. Juni 2010,

BERLIN/FRANKFURT/BERLIN/LONDON. Am Mittwoch eröffnete die britische Aufsichtsbehörde Financial Reporting Council eine formelle Untersuchung gegen die Wirtschaftsprüfer von Ernst & Young wegen des Verdachts, dass die Firma bei der Prüfung der Bücher der Pleitebank Lehman geschlampt hat.

Für die Branche ist dies ein Fanal. Anders als Banken, Hedge-Fonds und Rating-Agenturen wurde ihre Rolle in der Finanzkrise bislang kaum in Frage gestellt. (bis auf den Föhrenbergkreis-hfk)

Da braucht man sich nicht zu wundern!

Der IMF veröffentlichte gerade das ausgezeichnet Dokument “Current Account Balances in the Southern Euro Area”.

Die dort erschienenen Statistiken (von 1990 bis 2008) liessen eigentlich schon das Ärgste ahnen. Mit diesem wahnsinnigen Auseinanderdriften der Leistungsbilanzdefizite (Current Account Balnce) und der Lohnstückkosten (ULC) war die “Notwendigkeit” einer Krise ja schon klar vorhergesagt:

Leistungsbilanzdefizit:

Pro Land:

Spain Should Fight Markets’ Doubts with Bank Transparency

by Jacob Funk Kirkegaard | June 16th, 2010 | 05:32 pm  Peterson Institute

Paul Krugman recently argued on his blog that since Ireland faces higher government bond yields (5.27 versus 4.68 percent) and credit default swap (CDS) rates (226 versus 206) than those of Spain,¹ financial markets are not recognizing or rewarding Ireland’s early and decisive fiscal austerity measures. The inference he draws is that in their belt-tightening, Ireland and other countries may be overreacting to the example of Greece. This seems a strange argument for several reasons.

First, it assumes that the assessment applied by financial markets to the risk of Spain or Ireland government finances can be reduced to the issue of timing, a simplified view of their complex risk assessments, although the global financial crisis has revealed how having too much faith in financial markets’ risk assessments is dangerous.

Second, this argument also assumes that Spain and Ireland are quite similar, which is not the case. True, both countries ran prudent fiscal policies prior to the crisis, relative to their eurozone peers and hence both have relatively low general government gross debt burdens today—64 percent of GDP for Ireland and 53.2 percent of GDP for Spain in Q4 2009. Both countries suffered a collapse of their domestic housing markets, too.

The Euro: The Engine That Couldn’t

Josef Joffe, 4 Dec 97. Der berühmte Artikel des damaligen SZ chefredakteurs und heutigen Zeit-Herausgebers mit der Warnung vor der Euro Einführung, dass die monetäre Union nur eine politische sei. Aus der New York Review of Books. (hfk)

“European Monetary Union—The Movie” would have to begin with the following scene. The place is the library of the Elysée Palace, the time is about March 1990. Only three people are present: François Mitterrand, the French president; Helmut Kohl, the chancellor of soon-to-be reunited Germany; finally, since neither speaks the language of the other, a faceless interpreter sworn to silence.

Mitterrand is in a melancholy mood. During the last few months, ever since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, he has tried every conceivable diplomatic strategem to stop, or at least brake, the quickening pace of German reunification. But to no avail. Glumly, he stares into the fireplace, as his friend Helmut talks. “Look, François, this time it won’t be like Versailles in 1871, when Paris was encircled by German armies, when the new Reich was proclaimed on the ruins of French pride. We have Franco-German friendship, we have the European Union, our forces are completely integrated in NATO; indeed, we don’t even have our own general staff any more.”